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I 
REVIEW ESSAYS 
Tribe's Judicious Feminism 
Professor Anita L. Allen* 
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES. By Laurence H .  Tribe. New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1990. 242 pp. $19.95. 
I .  INTRODUCTION 
The title of Professor Laurence Tribe's recent book, A bortion: The Clash 
of Absolutes, brings to mind the din and fury of battle. However, beyond the 
brash red, white, and blue book jacket, one fi nds not a battlefield, but a 
courtroom of quiet reason. The Harvard scholar's serene assessment of 
abortion rights promises to illuminate for a wide audience both why the de­
mands of pro-choice feminists are not constitutionally extreme and why the 
purported policy compromises initiated by pro-life forces fail to qualify as 
compromises at all. Indeed, Tribe's judicious defense of the liberal pro­
choice perspective has already found favor in surprising quarters. Journalist 
Nat Hentoff, the self-described "atheist civil-libertarian pro-lifer," praises 
Tribe's presentation of the right to privacy as unusually "lucid. " 1 
The "absolutes" Tribe refers to are the strongly held belief in a woman's 
right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy, and the equally strong 
belief in a fetus's right to life. Professor Tribe's optimistic central thesis is 
that the clash between these absolutes is not an insurmountable obstacle to 
compromise: that the abortion issue need not produce irreconcilable conflict 
between groups favoring women's rights on the one hand and those favoring 
fetal rights on the other. Acknowledging the development of seemingly ab­
solute values on abortion in contemporary America, Tribe maintains that 
"[f]ar from being inevitable outgrowths of the natural order of things, these 
competing values are socially constructed. "2 He concludes that understand­
ing the social origins of these competing values paves the way for genuine 
compromise. 
The image of the abortion issue as a clash of absolutes is apt in many 
respects, whether one views the values at stake as natural and immutable or, 
with Tribe, as socially constructed. The aptness of Tribe's image is strongly 
$ Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I would like to thank Neil Freeman 
for his role in the preparation of this book review. 
1. Nat Hentoff, Abortion: Seeking a Common Ground. BosTON GLOBE, June 10, 1990, at B43. 
2. p 27. 
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suggested by at least a quarter century of public discussion and scholarly 
inquiry about abortion which centered on the "right to privacy" and the 
"right to life." But the image of the abortion issue as a clash of absolutes is 
also potentially misleading. Whether a woman's right to privacy ought to 
outweigh a fetus's right to life is but one normative question abortion poli cy 
raises. Tribe's unidimensional metaphor fails to capture other important 
questions that the abortion debate brings to mind. 3 Yet Tribe's profile of 
abortion policy is no mere sketch of a major public controversy. Details of 
history and constitutional theory make his study admirably complete. 
My goals here are first to convey the thrust of Tribe's perspective, and 
second to briefly evaluate Tribe's arguments for abortion privacy and against 
fetal personhood. Arguing with special clarity, Tribe defends the constitu­
tional privacy doctrine and its application to abortion laws on grounds that  
will sound familiar to  the legal academy. Revealing his considerable femi­
nism, Tribe's appeals to constitutional equal protection doctrines and to the 
history of gender roles to justify liberal abortion laws are more refreshing. 
Falling only somewhat short when he attempts to defend claims that a wo­
man's right to choose is fundamental to constitutionally protected liberty, 
Tribe's critical response to claims made on behalf of the fetus falls further 
from the mark. 
II .  WOMEN'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY 
A. Privacy Losing Ground 
Quite apart from the abortion issue, the idea of a fundamental right to 
privacy is losing ground. Its demise was foretol d  when, in Bowers v. Hard­
wick, the fundamental privacy right failed to protect sexual intimacy be-
3. Since the 1970s, academic philosophers with an interest in abortion law have focused on 
questions relating to whether the unborn are persons, whether the unborn have a right to life, and 
whether women's liberty, privacy, equality, or bodily integrity justify autonomous abortion choices. 
See, e.g., THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF ABORTION (Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel & Thomas 
Scanlon eds., 1 974). They have also focused on whether parenthood or parenting obligations coun­
termand abortion and whether just governments may impose or limit childbearing. See, e.g.. Sara 
Ann Ketchum, The Moral Status of the Bodies of Persons, 1 0  Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 25 (1984); 
Steven L. Ross, The Death of the Fetus. II PHIL & Pus. AFF. 232 ( 1 9 82); Roger Wertheimer, 
Understanding the Abortion Argument, I PHIL & Pus. AFF. 67 ( 1 97 1 ); Mark R. Wicclair, The 
Abortion Controversy and the Claim That This Body is Mine, 7 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 337 (i 981 ). 
The requirements of virtue ethics, an ethic of care, and of moral decisionmaking-in-context have 
captured the attention of some philosophers interested in abortion, including some feminist philoso­
phers. See, e.g., Kathryn Pyne Adde!son, Moral Passages, in WOMEN AND MORAL THEORY 87 (Eva 
Feder Kittay & Diana T. Meyers eds., 1 987); Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Theory and Abortion, 20 
PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 223 ( 1 99 1  ). Some have recently begun to raise questions about the varied mean­
ings diverse ethnic groups attach to pregnancy and abortion. 
At the same time, lawyers have focused primarily on questions of constitutional interpretation 
and adjudication, "fundamental" rights, federalism, the public/private distinction, the role of reli­
gion and morality in constitutional law, anonymous recordkeeping, the legal status of the fetus, 
equal protection for women and the unborn, public funding of poor women's abortions, regulating 
prenatal conduct, and the rights of minors. For a recent bibliography of such !ega! writi!1g, see 
ANITA L. ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN JN A FREE SOCIETY, 199 n. l6, 200 nn. 
28-30, 201 nn.32-33, 202 nn. 52  & 54, 203 nn.60-61 (19S8). 
I 
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tween consenting adults.4 The Supreme C ourt in Bowers upheld a Georgia 
criminal statute under which a man was charged after police discovered him 
engaging in homosexual sodomy in his own home. 
Arguably, Bowers implied no adverse destiny for the ri ght to privacy doc· 
t rine; the decision merely pronounced that the Court would limit fundamen· 
tal privacy protection to heterosexual intercourse, reproduction, and family 
life. However, the majority opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist in Cruzan v. 
Director, Missouri Department of Health was more clearly a dirge. 5 In the 
name of Nancy C ruzan's "privacy," Justice Rehnquist asked only whether 
her Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest was vio lated by the Misso uri 
Supreme C ourt 's ruling that "clear and convincing evidence" of her own 
wishes must be presented in proceedings brought to terminate life sust aining 
treatment . 
Why is the concept of a fundamental constitutional right to privacy--one 
requiring strict judicial scrutiny-losing ground in the Supreme Court ?  
Why i s  the privacy argument for abortion rights not holding sway with v ocal 
segments of the general public? What is the case for federal constitut io nal 
protection of abo rtion choice? A bortion: The Clash of Absolutes is perhaps 
best viewed as a respected scholar's response to just these questions. 
Early in his book, Professor Tribe traces the evolution o f  women's consti· 
tutional right to abortion fro m  Roe v. Wade6 to Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services.7 T ribe explains how, after pronouncing in Roe t hat women 
have a "fundamental" right to decide whether to have an abortion, the 
Court initially "issued a series o f  opinions both reaffirming the rules of Roe 
and . . .  applying them to specific cases."8 Yet, Tribe notes, a dramatic 
change in the composition of the Court in the 1 980s winnowed t he 7·2 Roe 
majority to a narrow 5· 4 margin. The Court's 1989 Webster decision pro· 
duced only "four solid votes to reaffirm Roe," after which "the tenuous na· 
ture of the constitutional right to choose to terminate a pregnancy was 
evident t o  anyone who could count."9 Since the publication of Tribe's book, 
the Supreme Court has handed down new decisions upho lding abo rtion re· 
strict ions. The right to choose abortion has become more tenuous still. 
With the retirement of Justice Thurgood Marshall, abortion privacy is 
threatened with imminent extinction. 
A number of academic commentators have been deeply crit ical of the 
legal evolution Tribe soberly recounts.  Reacting to Webster, Ro nald Dwor­
kin accused the plurality  of premising its attack on Roe on "stunningly bad 
argument . " 10 Indeed, one may wonder whether the Court made any argu-
4. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Cf Jed Rubenfeld, The Right iO Pri vacy, 102 
HARY. L. REV. 737, 746-47 (1989) (arguing that Bowers may foretoken the decline of the privacy 
doctrine). 
5. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). 
6. 410 U.S. !13 (1973). 
7. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
8. P. 14. 
9. P. 20. 
10. Ronald Dworkin, The Future of Abortion, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Sep. 28, 1989, at 47. 47. 
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ment at all in Webster. The Court appeared to ignore the wealth of argu­
ments in defense of Roe that have emerged since 1972, rej ecting Roe without 
explaining "what, if anything, was wrong with the decision . " 1 1  
For all the build-up that it received, the Webster case was a phenomenal 
disappointment when it came to settling the fate of Roe, the constitutional 
privacy doctrine, and the constitutional status of the unborn. 12 Subsequent 
Supreme Court cases have been no better. Each one validated restrictions on 
abortion imposed by state or federal authorities, and yet none directly con­
fronted Roe. 
In two 1990 abortion cases, Hodgson v. Minnesota 1 3 and Ohio v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health, 14 the idea of the abortion right as fundamen­
tal, and thus commanding the strict judicial scrutiny of compelling state in­
terest analysis, played no role in the majority opinions. Indeed, in Hodgson 
Justice Stevens stood with Justice O 'Connor rather than his more liberal 
colleagues to uphold restrictions on abortions that do not "unduly burden" 
the fundamental rights of minors. 1 5 Skirting Roe's requirement that govern­
ment justify abortion restrictions on the bas!s of compelling public interests, 
Justice O'Connor would have the C ourt test the constitutionality of abortion 
restrictions on the basis of whether such restrictions impose an "undue bur­
den" on a fundamental right. 16 
In the 199 1  decision, R ust v. Sullivan, 1 7 Justice O'Connor partly agreed 
with abortion liberals on the Court. Along with Justices Blackmun, Mar­
shall, and Stevens, she declined to join a five justice majority in upholding 
recently reinterpreted abortion restrictions promulgated by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services pursuant to Title X of the Public Health Serv­
ices Act. 18 The majority held that "gag rule" regulations prohibiting the 
dissemination of medical information or advice about abortion were a rea­
sonable interpretation of earlier statutes prohibiting abortion-related activi­
ties in family planning programs receiving federal funds. Justice Rehnquist 
argued for the majority that, without abridging constitutionally protected 
free speech or due process, "government may 'make a value judgment favor­
ing childbirth over abor tion, and . . .  implement that judgment by the alloca­
tion of public funds. '  " 1 9 Describing the majority analysis as "facile" and 
"disingenuous," Justice Blackmun countered that First and Fifth Amend­
ment rights of speech and privacy invalidate the Title X gag rule.20 But 
Justice O'Connor's R ust dissent shined no ray of hope on the survival of the 
I I . Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme Court: The Retreat from 
Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 83 ,  84 (1 989). 
12. See Anita L. Allen, Webster Marks Time, 2 BJOLAW U:l531 (Sep./Oct. 1989). 
1 3 . 1 1 0  S .  Ct. 2926 (1 990). 
1 4. 110 S .  Ct. 2972 ( 1 990). 
15. Hodgson, 1 1 0  S. Ct. at 2944. 
16. !d. at 2949-50 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part); see also Anita L. Allen, Court Disables 
Disputed Legacy of Privacy Right, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 1 3, 1 990, at S8, Sl4. 
1 7 . I ll S. Ct. 1759 (1 991) .  
18. !d. at 1778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
19. !d. at 1772 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)). 
20. !d. at 1 778  (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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abortion privacy doctrine. She avoided premising her dissent on substantive 
privacy rights protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four­
teenth Amendments. Rather, citing canons of statutory construction, she 
argued that "neither the language nor the history of [the Public H ealth Ser­
vice Act] compels the Secretary's interpretation, and . . .  the interpretation 
raises serious First Amendment concerns . " 21 
B. Abortion Privacy as Constitutional and Fundamental 
With an eye toward rehabilitating the right to choose, Professor Tribe 
surveys the pro-choice arguments and analyzes the constitutional basis for a 
woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. But first he pauses over two 
common procedural objections to Roe and its progeny: ( 1) that the right to 
privacy is not in the text of the Constitution, and (2), its corollary, that 
legislators, not judges, should decide the abortion question. 
Reacting to the former objection, Tribe emphatically disputes the con­
servatives' view, shared by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and 
White, that the Due Process Clauses provide only procedural protection 
against the deprivation of liberty. 22 Tribe points out that a long line of 
Supreme Court decisions has held that the protection of "liberty" contained 
in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause has the effect of apply­
ing the Bill of Rights (the text of which refers only to the federal govern­
ment) with equal force to the states. Since the Bill of Rights undeniably 
contemplates substantive rights, "the claim that the liberty clause is 'en­
tirely' procedural is unsustainable. " 23 Thus, the issue for Tribe becomes 
whether the meaning of "liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment is lim­
ited to the protections specifically listed in the Bill of Rights. 
The answer to this question seems obvious to Tribe: The Constitution 
was not intended to be, and has never been interpreted as being, a compre­
hensive list of the rights of the people-"[T]he Supreme Court has consist­
ently recognized that in adopting the Constitution the people did not mean 
to place the bulk of their hard-won liberty in the hands of government save 
only for those ri ghts specifically mentioned. " 24 Consequently, the fact that 
the word "privacy" does not appear in the Constitution does not preclude 
judicial recognition of a constitutional right to privacy. 
As for the latter objection, that legislators represent the people, and 
therefore they , not judges, should resolve the abortion issue, Tribe concedes 
that Roe may be antidemocratic. But he convincingly counters that "[t]he 
whole point of an independent judiciary is to be 'antidemocratic, ' to preserve 
21. Jd. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
22. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507 (1989) ("[T]he Due Process 
Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be neces­
sary to secure life, libeny, or propeny interests of which the government itself may not deprive the 
individual." (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 
( 1989))). 
23.  P. 87 .  
24. P. 90. 
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from transient majorities those human rights and other princi ples to  which 
our legal and political system is committed. " 25 Thus, i f  there is a constitu­
tional right to abortion, Tribe argues, it is  the Supreme Court's duty to be 
antidemocratic by striking down any state legislation that violates that 
ri ght. 26 
As one might expect, a direct substantive defense of the jurisprudence of 
Roe is an important step in Tribe's overall analysis .  H e  argues that a wo­
man's right to an aborti on is  grounded in the constituti onal right to privacy, 
and that it  is a fundamental right, which states may restrict only with the 
most compelling justifications. 
Reci ting pertinent history, Tribe notes that Skinner v. Oklahoma27 was 
the first case in which the Supreme Court applied the fundamental right of 
privacy to reproduction. There, the Court struck down an Oklahoma stat­
ute prescribing the forced steri lization of certain criminals,  recognizing what 
Tribe calls "the grotesque disempowerment that could occur if the choice of 
whether to beget a child were transferred from the indi vi duai to the state . " 28 
Later, in Griswold v. Connecticut 29 and in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 30 the Court 
struck down state statutes restricting the use of contraceptives. According 
to Tribe, " [w]hat is  really protected as a fundamental right in the contracep­
tion cases is the right to engage in sexual intercourse without having a 
chi ld.  " 31 Since aborti on implicates this very right, and since forcing a wo­
man to undergo the rigors and possible stigma of unwanted pregnancy and 
childbirth is an even greater personal invasion than regulation of contr acep­
tives, it  seems fair to say that a woman's right to termi nate her pregnancy is 
fundamental. 
In classifying a woman's right to choose abortion as "fundamental," 
Tribe refers to the Court's "long tradition of asking first about the right that 
is asserted, to see whether it is a fundamental liberty, and only then turning 
to the reasons, such as protection of the fetus's right to life, that might none­
theless justify that liberty's abridgment. " 32 By thus challenging the perspec­
tive that the effect of abortion on the fetus must be considered in the very 
formulation of women's right to abortion privacy, Tribe takes on two of the 
Supreme Court's most ardent foes of Roe. Justices Scalia and White define 
women's liberty in the abortion context in just this way, contemplating that 
the ri ght to kill a fetus cannot plausibly be considered fundamental. 33 
25. P. 80. 
26. See also Ronald Dworkin, The Reagan Revolution and the Suprem:: Court, N.Y. REV. 
BooKs, July 18 , 1 99 1 ,  at 23, 23 (book review) ("America's principal contribution to political theory 
is a conception of democracy according to which the protection of individual rights is a precondi­
tion, not a compromise, of that form of government."). 
27. 3 1 6  U.S. 535 (1942). 
28 .  P. 93. 
29. 381  U.S. 4 79 ( 1 965). 
30. 405 U.S. 438 ( 1 972). 
3 1 .  P. 94. 
32. P. 96. 
33 .  P. 97 (referring to Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 1 10, i24 
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Tribe states that this approach, appl ied across the board, "woul d  do vio­
lence to all our rights. " 34 For example, the state's power of militar y  con­
s cr iption, w hich obviousl y  impairs fundamental l iberties, is available only 
under compelling circumstances. The state may not, for example, d raft its 
citizens merely to act as chauffeurs f or public officials.  However, Tribe ar­
gues that under the Scalia and White approach a citizen's right not to be 
made a chauffeur woul d  be defined as the right to inhibit efficient chauffeur 
s ervice for public officials, which no one regards as a fundamental right. " If 
we incorporat e  the state's reason f or its regulation into the initial definition 
of the l iberty," Tribe writes, "the f undamental nature of that l iberty inevita­
bly vanishes."35 Perhaps the fundamental character of sexual autonomy van­
ished in Bowers because the Court quickl y  embraced moral tradition as a 
"reason" for regulating homosexual ity. The better approach in the abortion 
context is first to determine whether the woman's interest in terminating her 
pregnancy is a fundamental right, and then to consider whether the state has 
a compelling interest in restricting it. 
The question of fundamentality should drive courts toward an assess­
ment of how valuable the l iberty-whether to choose abortion or to choose 
homosexual intimacy-is to the overall liberty of the right-h ol der. Persuad­
ing non-believers that pri vate abortion choices are a fundamental liberty is 
crucial for the l iberal cause. Professor Tribe does a fine job, as others have 
done, 36 of countering the argument that the right to privacy l acks a textual 
basis.  H e  also does a good job of formulating the practical and conceptual 
links between abortion rights and constitutional liberty for women. 
Less adequate is his account of the practical and conceptual links among 
constitutional liberty, abortion rights, and privacy. It is in expl aining what 
privacy-in its several senses-has to do with constitutional liberty and 
abortion rights that Tribe's discussion f alls somewhat short. This deficiency 
is significant. Robert Bork, f or example, has argued not only that the gen­
eral right to privacy is not contained in the text of the Constitution, but also 
that he cannot grasp the purported conceptual link between that right and 
abortion. 37 
To get a grip on the connections among constitutional liber ty, abortion 
rights, and privacy, it is useful to consider the inter ests of individual s  that 
are threatened when governments attempt to curtail abor ti on choices. 3 8 I n  
TiVhalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court i n  effect noted three main "privacy" in­
ten�sts amenable to legal protection: ( 1) an interest in autonomous decisi on­
making , (2) an interest in confidentiality, and (3) an interest in physical 
n.4 (! 989) (plurality opir.ion), and Justice White's dissenting opinion in Thornburgh v. American 
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 792 n.2 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)). 
34. P. 97. 
35. P. 98. 
36. See. e.g., D,WlD A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTiTUTION 231-81 (1986). 
37. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITIC.">L SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW 97, 11!-16 (1990). 
38. See A. ALLEN, supra note 3; Anita L. Allen, Taking Liberties: PriYacy, Private Choice, and 
Social Contract Theory, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 461 (1987). 
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seclusion. 39 Privacy in all three of these impo rtant senses is  at  stake in the 
choice of competing abortion policies. 
At issue primarily is the interest of all women in making choices about 
reproduction that are not mandated by government. Autonomous choices, 
free of the controlling interference of public officials, are "private" choices. 
To believe in the right to privacy, we need not believe that nature divides 
social life literally into public and private realms.40 We can coherently de­
scribe the condition of being relatively free of the most direct, consequential, 
and commonly offensive governmental interference as our "privacy. "  In this 
sense of the term, "privacy" connotes autonomy, liberty, freedom, and the 
peace of mind which stems from the independent exercise of one's own 
judgment.4 1 
Restrictive state regulation of abortion threatens a second "privacy" in­
terest: the confidentiality of the physician-patient relationship.  This form of 
privacy calls for a strong presumption in favor of confidential record keeping 
and anonymous public reporting. A third "privacy" interest touched by 
restrictive abortion laws is the interest in physical seclusion.42 This interest 
is at once an interest in restricting access to one's body and restricting access 
to one's home or other physical retreat. For example, many forms of physi­
cal contact actionable as battery or trespass in tort law interfere with the 
interest in seclusion. Crowded accommodations--or intimacy and responsi­
bility within spacious ones-also interfere with seclusion.  Typical American 
homes are a secure retreat from strangers, but whether a person's home is 
also a shelter from unwanted contact with intimates depends upon vari ables 
such as family size and responsibilities. For most people in our society, wo­
men especially, the responsibilities of parenting small children cut deeply 
into opportunities for privacy. The ability to control  repro duction is there­
fo re an important precondition of privacy at home. 
Abortion cases from Roe through Thornburgh v. American College of Ob­
stetricians and Gynecologists43 repeatedly emphasized the impo rtance of au­
tonomous decisionmaking. Thornburgh emphasized both autonomous 
decisionmaking and confidentiality.44 No co urt has noted the distinct pri­
vacy implications of childbearing on the traditional understanding of the 
home as a peaceful retreat, however Justice Blackmun' s  opinion in Roe 
broached without approval the notion that the Constitution might protect 
39. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,  598-600 & n.24 ( 1 977). 
40. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 22-78 ( 1 958); cf. Howard B. Radest, 
The Public and the Private: An American Fairy Tale, 89 ETHICS 280 ( 1 979) (arguing that room for 
privacy might be found in the interaction between polity and community). 
4 1 .  Cf. Joseph Kupfer, Privacy, Autonomy and Self-Concept, 24 AM. PHIL. Q. 8 1 ,  82 ( 1 987) 
("[P]rivacy is essential to the development and maintenance of an autonomous self. . . .  [A]utonomy 
... includes a concept of oneself as a purposeful, self-determining, responsible agent."). 
42. I explore this less familiar argument for abortion rights in Uneasy Access. A. ALLEN, supra 
note 3, at 54-8 1 .  
43. 476 U.S. 747 ( 1 986). 
44. The Court invalidated state data-collection requirements that would place otherwise confi­
dential information about individual abortion patients into the hands of public authorities, condemn­
ing these requirements as unconstitutional indirect constraints on abortion rights guaranteed in Roe. 
I 
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bodily integrity. He expressly rejected the argument of certain amici that 
criminal abortion statutes should be constituti onally invalidated on grounds 
of interference with women's bodily integrity. Then, in one of the most con­
fusing passages in Roe, he suggested that as pregnancy progresses a woman 
"cannot be isolated. "45 Because a woman and her fetus functi on as a biolog­
ical unit, Justice Blackmun inferred that government has grounds under the 
constitution for limiting her autonomy. 
The inference here, that women who lack privacy in the sense of physical 
seclusion therefore lack privacy in the sense of autonomous deci si onmaki ng, 
fallaciously confl.ates two distinct senses of "privacy. "  Moreover, Justice 
Blackmun's characterization of pregnant women as ipso facto not "isolated" 
problematically assumes that the unborn are the metaphysical and moral 
equivalents of persons for purposes of describing conditions of privacy. To 
treat the unborn as relevant for purposes of the discourse of physical seclu­
sion, even though they do not watch and listen in ways that give rise to 
modesty and shame, requires an argument. 
Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe was not successful in setting out the 
conceptual connection between privacy and abortion.46 He failed to distin­
guish carefully the physical privacy of seclusi on from the decisional privacy 
of liberty or autonomous choice. One might ascribe a similar failure to Jus­
tice D ouglas. His majority opinion in Griswold did not carefully distinguish 
the physical privacy of a marital bedroom unpoliced by law enforcement 
agents from the decisional privacy of liberty to seek, purchase, and use con­
tracepti on.47 Justice D ouglas's potentially confusing appeal to the concept 
of privacy, combined with his vague assertion that the right to privacy sub­
sists in the penumbra of the Constitution's express provisions, cast a regret­
table shadow over the Court's first announcement of fundamental privacy 
protecti on. 
These admi tted inadequacies were never a sign that a jurisprudence of 
fundamental privacy was inherently untenable. Indeed, the straightforward 
jurisprudence of privacy elaborated in Roe's progeny is n ot weighed down by 
the ambiguity and metaphor that marred the earliest eff orts. Thornburgh 
cites the textual liberty of the Fourteenth Amendment as a source of sub­
stantive fundamental rights, concluding that having a choice about whether 
to bring a child into the world numbers among the constitutionally protected 
fundamental liberties.48 In fact, the argument of Thornburgh is that few 
liberties are more critical to the lives of young women than the ability pri­
vately to choose whether to bear children. Rights protecting sexual auton­
omy, contraceptive choice, and abortion choice are therefore key resources 
for women. 
It is notew orth y that the J ustices who have cast their votes in favor of 
45. Roe, 410 U.S. at !59. 
46. See Allen, supra note 38, at 468. 
47. Griswold v. Connectic,Jt, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). 
48. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772. 
188 STANFORD LAW REVIEW (Vol. 44: 179 
upholding abortion restrictions have not expressly grappled with what the 
dissent in Webster termed the "inevitable and brutal consequences" of anti­
abortion laws.49 Approximately 1.5 million preteen, tee?age, and adult �o­
men obtain abortions each year. 50 Abortion was exceedmgly common pnor 
to Roe, when as many as 330,000 illegal abortions were performed each 
year. 51 Legislated limitations on abortion will most severely affect poor wo­
men. To severely affect impoverished Americans is to severely affect blacks 
and Hispanics, who are disproportionately poor. At present, 43.2 percent of 
black women with children under 18 live in poverty.52 
Children, even wanted children, impose special burdens on the poor. 
School-aged girls and working women lack adequate daycare and welfare 
assistance for their children. While some pregnant women can count on 
adoption to provide homes for unwanted children, adoption is not an attrac­
tive option for women whose black, ill, or handicapped children would likely 
not be placed in adoptive homes. Ideally, the Supreme Court would refrain 
from cementing unworkable, sentimental ideals of family life into constitu­
tional law. Yet the Supreme Court has often done just that, to the detriment 
of the least advantaged. The Court has upheld the constitutionality of legis­
lation banning state and federal medicaid funding for elective abortion and 
prohibiting doctors in federally funded family planning clinics from men­
tioning abortion as an option for their patients. Decisions like Rust, 53 Web­
ster, 54 Harris v. McRae,55 Poelker v. Doe,56 and Maher v. Roe51 legitimate 
the imposition of maternity on lower income women. 
If state and federal governments ultimately succeed in erecting prohibi­
tive barriers to abortion, as several have already done, the number of self­
induced and unlicensed abortions may rise to alarming pre-Roe levels. It 
was not surprising that, as anxieties about the overturning of Roe reached 
fever pitch prior to the Webster decision, a California group disseminated a 
video about a do-it-yourself abortion technique they called "menstrual 
extraction. "58 
These evocative social concerns bear directly on the constitutional rights 
of women. They are the context for answering the question, posed by consti-
49. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 558 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concur­
ring in part and dissenting in part). 
50. The figure is widely cited. See, e.g., Phillip Elmer-DeWitt, A Bitter Pill to Swallow: Birth 
Control in the U.S. is Out of Date�nd Getting More So, TIME, Feb. 26, 1990, at 44, 44. 
51. Russell S. Fisher, Criminal Abortion, in ABORTION IN AMERICA 3, 6 (Harold Rosen ed., 
1967) (rev. ed. of THERAPEUTIC ABORTION (1954)). 
52. David H. Swinton, The Economic Status of African Americans: "Permanent" Poverty and 
Inequality, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICA 199!, at 25, 43 (Janet Dewart ed., 1991) (summariz­
ing government statistics). 
53. I ll S. Ct. 1759 (1991). 
54. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
55. 448 u.s. 297 (1980). 
56. 432 U.S. 519 (1977). 
57. 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
58. No GOING BACK: A PRO-CHOICE PERSPECTIVE (The Federation of Feminist Women's 
Health Center 1989) (on file with author). This 28-minute film is available from the producers in 
Los Angeles. 
November 199 1 ]  TRIBE'S JUDICIOUS FEMINISM 189 
tutional courts themselves, of how deeply liberty is  touched by aborti on re­
stricti ons. Liberty is so deeply affected that thousands of women would 
rather risk infertility or death in unskilled hands than carry their 
pregnancies to term .  
Tribe's sympathetic expli cati on o f  the jurisprudence o f  Roe potentially 
reassures readers that there is a defensible constitutional argument for abor­
ti on ri ghts. But the argument Tribe defends has proven to be controvertible. 
One kind of critic admits that the right to pri vacy is  fundamental and that 
aborti on is  conceptually and practically linked with pri vacy, but fails-even 
after all the social evidence is in-to be persuaded that abortion rights are 
import ant enough to the experi ence of privacy to warrant consti tutional pro­
tection. Indeed, the fact that abortion rights are not explicitly protected in 
the Constitution and are not universally demanded strikes some as  evidence 
that anti-abortion statutes must not be a constitutionally significant imposi­
tion on a fundamental right. 
Uncongenial to any "fundamental" concepti on of privacy rights, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Whi te maintain that the argument for treating 
abortion rights as fundamental is  particularly weak. 59 Closely reading the 
r elevant precedents, they deny that abortion rights are deeply rooted in the 
history and tradition of the nati on.60 They deny, too, that abortion rights 
are essential to the concept of ordered liberty. 61 Because they beli eve abor­
ti on fails these constitutional tests, they conclude that abortion pri vacy is not 
a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Tribe's indirect answer to these arguments is a historical survey of the 
roots of both the "pro-life" and "pro-choice" movements in this country 
from the American Revolution to the present. Tribe str esses an observation 
mentioned by Justice Blackmun in Roe. Abortion was l egal and not uncom­
mon in 1ate ei ghteenth and early nineteenth century Ameri ca.6 2  Because 
children wer e  regarded as economic assets to western frontier families, wo­
men who sought abortions were primarily single women. Therefore, any 
negative connotati ons attached to abortion stemmed not from pro-life senti­
ments, but from the view that premarital sex was i mmoral. 63 
However, aborti on at this time was by no means as safe a procedure as it  
is  today-Tribe ci tes a 30 percent death rate for all surgi cal abortions in 
59. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. a t  785-814 (1986) (White, J., joined b y  Rehnquist, C.J., dissent­
ing). But cf Justice Powell's opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) 
(plurality opinion) ("Constitution protects the sanctity of the family because the institution ... is 
deeply rooted in [U.S.] history and tradition."). 
60. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 793-94 (White, J., dissenting); cf Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 
319, 325-26 ( 1937) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment Liberty Clause incorporates only those 
rights that are essential to ordered liberty). 
61. Thornbu.;-gh, 476 U.S. at 790-94 (White, J., dissenting). But cf ivfoore, 436 U.S. at 499-504 
& n.IO (plurality opinion) (arguing that the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be 
limited by arbitrary line drawing). 
62. Roe, 410 U.S. at 138; pp. 28-29; see a/so DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX 
DlSCRJMINATION AND THE LAW 202-07 (1989). 
63. p 29. 
' 
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early nineteenth century New York. 64 Thus safety concerns soon led to the 
first statutory regulation of abortion, passed in Connecticut in 1821. The 
Connecticut statute did not prohibit all abortions, but only those induced 
through the use of dangerous poisons. Fetal protection, Tribe concludes, 
was not the statute's goal. The genesis of the movement to restrict abortion 
in the United States "was neither religious belief nor a popular moral cru­
sade."65 On the contrary, the movement was the product of an organized 
lobbying effort by the medical profession in the mid-nineteenth century. 
The doctors were spurred by two concerns. First, for both safety and 
business reasons, they wished to eliminate the performance of abortions by 
irregular physicians and by apothecaries promising miracle abortion tech­
niques. Second, the notion that the fetus is a human life gained increasing 
acceptance throughout the medical profession. An elite profession with an 
increasingly technical appreciation of inner anatomy, they drew moral con­
clusions from the physiological fact that the unborn come to possess dis­
tinctly human traits many weeks prior to delivery from the womb. To 
advance their views, physicians organized a national lobbying effort, using 
arguments designed to strike a responsive chord in the hearts of the people. 
These included assertions that abortion is murder, which influenced the 
powerful Catholic Church, and that abortion poses a threat to traditional sex 
roles by enabling women to escape their duty as child bearers. 66 
In time, the efforts of the medical profession "altered the prevailing atti­
tudes about the practice [of abortion] in the United States ."67 By the turn of 
the century, more than forty states had passed statutes restricting abortion 
to instances when it was necessary to save the life of the woman. 68 Accord­
ing to Tribe, a movement to reform the strict abortion laws began in the 
1 9 50s. Women's groups began to call for the repeal of restrictive laws, but 
by 1 973, when Roe was adjudicated, only four states had guaranteed women 
the right to terminate their own pregnancies. Tribe concludes that, had the 
Supreme Court not intervened in Roe by invalidating anti-abortion statutes, 
most states would not have repealed their restrictive laws. 69 
Tribe states that the true motivation for abortion restrictions appears to 
stem not from a belief that the fetus is a person, but from the desire to rein­
force the traditional role of women as virtuous childbearers.70 In defense of 
this contention, Tribe points out that abortion is the "only .. . place in the 
law where a really significant and intimate sacrifice has been required of 
anyone in order to save another."7 1 Because abortion restrictions burden 
only women, "a ban [on abortion] places women, by accident of their biol-
64. Id. 
65. p 30. 
66. Pp. 30-34. 
67. P. 30. 
68. p 34. 
69. Pp. 35-51. 
70. His discussion of the rape or incest exception most clearly illustrates this point. Pp. 233-
34. 
71. p 131. 
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ogy, in a permanently and irrevocably subordinate position to men. "72 
While abortion opponents generally favor allowing the procedure in 
cases of rape or incest, they would prohibit abortion in cases of simple con­
traceptive failure. According to Tribe, this inconsistency suggests that the 
key to the antiabortion view is not the voluntary nature of the pregnancy, 
but the voluntary nature of the sexual conduct. Thus, it appears that "such 
antiabortion views are driven less by the innocence of the fetus . . .  than by 
the supposed 'guilt' of the woman."73 Antiabortion statutes are, therefore, 
attempts to "impose virtue" on women. Further societal disrespect of wo­
men's judgment is reflected in statutory requirements that would hamper 
women in choosing abortions. For example, waiting periods imply "an as­
sumption that a woman making this decision is misguided and is likely to be 
acting rashly."74 Thus, as Tribe maintains and as many feminists have ar­
gued, abortion restrictions are merely manifestations of broader societal 
views about the roles and capacities of women. 
C. The Equal Protection A lternative 
Professor Tribe's endorsement of an equal protection rationale for abor­
tion rights is partly responsive to the concerns of feminists like Catharine 
MacKinnon and Deborah Rhode, who believe that a privacy jurisprudence 
fails to capture women's full stake in the abortion question. 75 Although the 
Supreme Court's Fourteenth Amendment analysis in Roe relied solely on the 
Liberty Clause, Tribe believes the Equal Protection Clause in the same 
amendment also substantiates the right to abortion. Given that the Skinner 
Court recognized a fundamental right to control one's own reproduction, 
and given that laws restricting abortion negatively affect only women's 
lives, 76 Tribe believes that such laws "place a real and substantial burden on 
women's abiliiy to participate in society as equals. "77 
Tribe does well to see equal protection analysis as an additional argu­
ment, rather than as a substitute for the privacy-based rationale for abortion 
rights. Many feminists argue that privacy jurisprudence fails to fully pro­
mote, and may actually harm, women's interests. Catharine MacKinnon's 
Feminism Unmodified, which rejects the privacy rationale, may be viewed in 
72. P. 1 32. 
73. !d. 
74. p 1 37. 
75. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 
96- 1 02 ( 1 987); D. RHODE, supra note 62. Feminist attacks on the idea of privacy for women began 
in the nineteenth century. In Women and Economics, Charlotte Perkins (Stetson) Gilman "decon­
structed" the idea of domestic privacy, demonstrating that middle class homes are not seats of mean­
ingful privacy, especially for married women with children. CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, 
WOMEN AND ECONOMICS 248-69 (Carl N. Degler ed.,  Harper & Row 1966) ( 1 898). 
76. Restrictive abortion laws sometimes negatively affect men's lives too. From an economic 
point of view, for example, unwanted children are burdens for their fathers. Although men have 
financial responsibility for their children, this burden is both indirect and not of the same character 
as the burden on women. !t  does not, therefore, eliminate the equal protection argument. 
77. p 105. 
. j  
l 
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this vein. 78 While her argument reveals some of Roe's shortcomings, 
MacKinnon understates the positive influence Roe has had in the quest for 
women's equality. 
The real problem is not with the right to privacy as such, but that women 
have had too much of the wrong kinds of privacy.79 The "wrong" kind­
that which MacKinnon emphasizes in her attack on Roe-is the "privacy" 
of the domestic sphere, where a dominant man controls sex and home life. 
The "right" kind of privacy, which MacKinnon disregards, gives women 
real choices. Privacy can enable some women to escape unhappy and op­
pressive lives, and others to experience the peace of mind conducive to their 
making contributions both inside and outside the domestic sphere. Other 
feminists reject privacy arguments for abortion because the concept of pri­
vacy presupposes liberal individualism, a concept they reject as incompatible 
with women's identities as interconnected, social beings. 80 Since virtually all 
cultures value privacy in some form or other, it is not persuasive to argue 
that privacy is contrary to women's natures or inherently anticom­
munitarian. Women writers like Emily Dickinson and May Sarton, who did 
not marry or have children and who deliberately worked in seclusion, illus­
trate that sweeping rejections of all forms of privacy as "male" and "liberal" 
are untenable. 8 1  
Despite the checkered history o f  the concept o f  privacy i n  the Western 
world and the failure of privacy arguments to be completely persuasive in 
practice, abandoning privacy arguments in favor of an exclusive reliance on 
equal protection arguments is not the answer. To be sure, equal protection 
analysis avoids the "substantive due process" quagmire of the privacy-as­
fundamental-liberty argument. Yet it does so only at significant cost. 
Viewed solely as a matter of equal protection, women's reproductive aspira­
tions must be framed in public legal discourse on the model of men's lives. 
Viewed as a matter of privacy, abortion rights clearly entail equality, and yet 
women are better able to assert that the autonomy they seek reflects their 
own experiences, rather than being the strict analogue of the autonomy men 
enJoy. 
It may be possible to make a case for abortion rights that does not ex­
pressly refer to privacy. 82 However, I conjecture that most American wo­
men would be unable to articulate fully their concerns about anti-abortion 
laws without appealing to notions of privacy. In talking about abortion, wo­
men commonly say that government should mind its own business. By us­
ing the term "privacy" in connection with abortion, women are able to draw 
78. C. MAcKINNON, supra note 75. 
79. This is the theme of Uneasy Access. A. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 70-72. 
80. Robin West has argued that the experiences of menstruation, heterosexual intercourse, 
pregnancy, and breast feeding make the liberal model of the separate, individual person i napplicable 
to women. Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 ( 1 988). 
8 1 .  See A. ALLEN, supra note 3, at 78-79. 
82. For example, a recent 28-minute pro-choice advocacy film delicately evaded rhe expression 
"privacy, " in an effort to deflect criticism. No GOING BACK:  A PRO-CHOICE PERSPECTIVE, supra 
note 58 .  
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on a wealth of shared meanings, including connotations of autonomy, inde­
pendence, and respect for others. Tribe wisely refuses to jettison privacy's 
rich semantic heritage when he embraces an equal protection analysis to sup­
port a woman's right to choose. 
III. FETAL PERSONHOOD 
I have set forth in some detail the kind of case Tribe makes for character­
izing abortion choice as a fundamental right. Tribe insists that doing justice 
vis-a-vis women's fundamental rights requires that particularly strong, 
"compelling" reasons be adduced if the constraint of abortion choices is to 
be constitutionally permissible. 
Doubtless the most cited putatively compelling reasons to constrain 
abortion choices refer to the interests of the unborn or the state's interests in 
the unborn. Have the unborn, in fact, interests that government may weigh? 
Does government have independent interests in the unborn that it may 
weigh? Privacy arguments for choice fail to persuade those who believe that 
the conceptus, embryo, fetus or unborn child (here, collectively, the "fetus") 
is of paramount moral concern. 
Despite the importance of autonomous decisionmaking for women, some 
believe that the human life developing in utero is invested with a special 
moral quality. Christopher Stone calls this quality "considerateness."8 3 
Others have labelled it "personhood," "potential personhood," "humanity,"  
or "potential humanity."  I will call this quality personhood, although few 
would say that the traits of self-conscious, rational, moral agency usually 
associated with personhood exist in a fully realized form in the unborn. Still, 
it is this quality that some see as making the state's interest in fetal life mor­
ally compelling. 
The argument that it is morally wrong for a woman to procure an abor­
tion because of the unborn's personhood passes over the value of the wo­
man's own personhood. There are two quantities of personhood at stake in 
the context of abortion: that of the woman and that of the fetus. Both enti­
ties are invested with human potential, but to different degrees. 84 The con­
siderable, but nonetheless inchoate potential of the unborn life is in 
competition with the more tangible potential of the pregnant woman. This 
"squaring off" of human potential in the moral debates about abortion 
seems unavoidable. 
Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous pro-choice argument premises abortion 
rights on the notion that women have a property interest in their bodies that 
is at least as strong as the inconsistent property interest the unborn have in 
theirs. 85 Women have a right, therefore, to rid themselves of, as it were, a 
trespassing fetus. Thomson's understanding of the implications of property 
8 3 .  CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS: THE CASE FOR MORAL PLURAL· 
ISM, 43-62, 73-83 ( 1 987). 
84. Allen, supra note 3 8, at 485-86. 
85. Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of A bortion, I PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 47, 48- 49 ( 1 97 1 ). 
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rights and related rights of bodily integrity is arguably severe. Yet, taking a 
different tack, it can be argued that our society has good reason for prefer­
ring the potential of the woman over that of the unborn. 
Preferring adult women is a way of rewarding the effort and self-disci­
pline that virtually every adult must bring to the conduct of his or her life. 
It is also a way of respecting plans and ambitions that may be inconsistent 
with pregnancy or parenting. It is, finally, a way of acknowledging the spe­
cial risks of pregnancy to health and wellbeing, and the value, to each person 
who can consciously choose, of being able to control such risks. Except per­
haps in a grossly underpopulated community, these considerations favor pre­
ferring the potential of the pregnant woman to that of the fetus. Professor 
Tribe does not, as I do, baldly state that society should prefer women's po­
tential to that of their fetuses. However, he does plainly imply an overvalua­
tion of the fetus and an untenable undervaluation of women. 
As interesting as this sort of moral reflection on the subject of abortion is, 
it does not directly address what could be the critical legal issue: the consti­
tutional status of the human fetus. Fetuses may be moral persons and yet 
fail to be legal, constitutional persons. 
Tribe maintains that, by stating in Roe that the fetus was not a person, 
the Supreme Court "needlessly insulted and alienated those for whom the 
view that the fetus is a person represents a fundamental article of faith. "86 
In doing so, the Court galvanized the pro-life movement and politicized the 
abortion issue. Tribe suggests that, had the Court employed equal protec­
tion analysis, it could have avoided this controversy while still articulating a 
meaningful statement about the rights of women in America. 87 
This intriguing thought is nevertheless misguided. Citizens are con­
cerned not just with the jurisprudential theories the Supreme Court employs, 
but also with the concrete implications of its decisions. For example, it is 
doubtful that equal protection arguments against slavery would have been 
more welcome to the ears of antebellum slaveholders in the American South 
than arguments against slavery premised on blacks having inalienable, com­
mercial privacy rights over their own persons. 
Although he seems to think the Court could have avoided it, Tribe him­
self takes up the question of the constitutional status of the unborn. He 
concludes that the fetus cannot be considered a "person" under the Consti­
tution. If it were, abortion would be the legal equivalent of murder. Tribe 
maintains that treating abortion as murder runs counter to the entire history 
of Anglo-American law. 88 Furthermore, no abortions, not even in the case 
of rape or incest, would be j ustified if abortion were considered murder. 
Even some birth control methods, such as the IUD (intrauterine device) and 
RU- 486 (the contragestational "abortion pill" recently developed in 
86. P. 1 35 .  
8 7 .  Jd. 
88 .  Historicaily. even when abortion was criminalized in America, it was a lesser crime than 
murder. P. 1 21 .  
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France), would b e  instruments of murder since they prevent the fertilized 
ovum from implanting in the wall of the uterus. 
Some have argued that the Constitution should be interpreted as permit­
ting the states to define the legal status of the fetus as they choose. Tribe 
counters that this would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the central 
purpose of which is "to prevent some states from adopting a narrower view 
of personhood than others. "89 Tribe also asserts that if states were allowed 
to define fetuses as persons, they might enact a variety of fetal endangerment 
statutes that could "obliterate a pregnant woman's liberty and her very per­
sonhood. "90 Pregnant women could be restricted from eating and drinking 
what they chose or engaging in any activity the state deemed hazardous to 
the fetus's health. 9 1 Thus, Tribe argues, neither the Supreme Court nor the 
states may legally recognize the fetus as a person. 
Tribe's constitutional argument against fetal personhood is philosoph­
ically troubling. Like many mainstream legal philosophers, he fails to give 
close attention to the principles of a jurisprudence of exclusion-the reasons 
courts should employ in deciding what kinds of entities matter in the law. 
The legal community is presently at odds over how best to characterize 
the legal status of the developing fetus. The unborn clearly matter in Ameri­
can law, but there is wide disagreement concerning the weight to attach to 
claims made on the basis of fetal health in the face of competing claims 
about the liberty and fundamental rights of pregnant women. On the one 
hand, the Anglo-American legal tradition has never accorded the full legal 
status of "person" to the unborn. For example, the Supreme Court has 
never held that they are "citizens" of the United States, entitled to the same 
constitutional rights as fully born persons. On the other hand, the unborn 
are taken into account in the allocation of property rights and the attribution 
of criminal and civil responsibility. Property can be bequeathed to the un­
born; many states make it a crime to kill a fetus; wrongful birth actions are 
torts premised on injurious acts or omissions respecting the unborn. 
Professor Ronald Dworkin, whose analysis of the constitutional status of 
the fetus has much in common with Professor Tribe's, argues against this 
same background of precedent that the best interpretation of constitutional 
law is that fetuses are not persons.92 One can agree with the conclusion 
Dworkin and Tribe reach without endorsing the mode of argument they em­
ploy. Indeed, one strains to understand what rules, principles, standards, or 
other norms a court facing a question of constitutional personhood is sup­
posed to rely upon. 
Both Dworkin and Tribe pose the crucial question-whether fetuses are 
constitutional persons-and then give less than satisfying answers. They say 
nothing to illuminate the law's jurisprudence of exclusion, and nothing to 
89.  p 1 26. 
90. P. 1 2 8 .  
9 1 .  Some o f  this i s  already happening. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug A ddicts Who 
Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 1 04  HARV. L. REV. 1 4 1 9  ( 1 99 1 ) .  
92.  Ronald Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, N.Y. REV.  BooKs, June 29,  1 9 89, at  49,  49. 
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indicate what specific principles should guide legal thinking about the consti­
tutional rights of the unborn. 
In keeping with his philosophy of "law as integrity," one would expect 
Dworkin to view the law as containing identifiable norms of exclusion dis­
cemable through constructive interpretation.9 3 Dworkin appears to follow 
his own prescription for legal reasoning when, with respect to fetal per­
sonhood, he argues: 
The question is one of legal interpretation. The principle that the fetus is 
not a constitutional person fits better with other parts of our law and also 
with our sense of how related issues would and should be decided if they 
arose than the rival principle that it is. . . . Apart from anti-abortion stat­
utes, there are few signs in our law of the kind of regulation of pregnancy 
that would be appropriate if the fetus were a constitutional person, and the 
Supreme Court has never suggested any constitutional requirement of such 
protection. 94 
When Dworkin invokes "our sense of how [fetal personhood] issues would 
and should be settled, "  to whose sense is he appealing? Perhaps that of the 
pro-choice forces within the community, with whom he happens to agree? 
The evasion of discord and ambiguity implicit in Dworkin's appeal to 
"our sense" of how related issues would and should be resolved is alarming. 
While often legitimate in normative argument, the appeal to moral para­
digms and legal expectations becomes indefensible in contexts where 
profound disagreement exists about the very paradigms and expectations 
employed. The United States is presently undergoing a crisis concerning 
appropriate public responses to abortion, prenatal injury and treatment, and 
the use of fetal tissue in medicine and research, precisely because the applica­
ble norms are unsettled. Neither Tribe's nor Dworkin's interpretative ap­
peal to norms implicit in the law produces persuasive results. Perhaps they 
could not in areas of the law, like this one, where past political acts and their 
meanings are themselves controversial. When Dworkin writes that estab­
lished law or its best interpretation clearly opposes fetal personhood, his rich 
prose rings of false bravado. 
Both Tribe and Dworkin argue that if one deeply probes the totality of 
one's beliefs about law, it becomes clear that one does not, and cannot, be­
lieve that abortion is murder and the fetus is a constitutional person. While 
feminists may applaud this conclusion, the conservative, conventionalist, 
and positivist nature of the inquiry-"there are few signs in our law"-is not 
a distinctly "feminist" or otherwise progressive mode of analysis. Dworkin, 
especially, lays out no principles to ease the mind of someone who fears that 
Roe is really Dred Scott for the unborn. Tribe, on the other hand, obliquely 
addresses such fears by implying that those who oppose the right to choose 
abortion often subscribe to a constitutionally untenable tradition that subor­
dinates women. In fact, Tribe's rendition of women's history, rather than 
93. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE ( 1 986). 
94. Dworkin, supra note 92, at 50 (emphasis added). 
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any narrow constitutional argument, is at  the heart of his claim against fetal 
personhood. 95 
Another distinction between the approaches of Tribe and Dworkin arises 
out of Dworkin's claim that if a fetus is a constitutional person, then Roe v. 
Wade is "plainly wrong" on equal protection grounds. Knowingly killing a 
person, says Dworkin, is a crime in every state. Focusing on equality be­
tween pregnant women and their potential children, Dworkin does not satis­
factorily answer the obvious concern about equality between women and 
men. Tribe, however, stresses that women have a right to live as freely and 
capably as do men. He thus avoids the trap that Dworkin falls into when his 
own requirement of "fit" conflicts with his equal protection analysis. Would 
a requirement that a woman carry her pregnancy to term fit a system of laws 
that otherwise eschews good samaritan duties? It seems doubtful. If this 
requirement were nevertheless imposed, how broad would the exception be? 
One must ask whether the argument that mothers must make their bodies 
available to their children means, for example, that the state will require of a 
parent whose fatally ill child needs a liver transplant that he or she donate a 
lobe to keep the child alive. 
IV. THE POLITICS OF COMPROMISE 
Tribe illuminates why the privacy argument for access to medically safe 
abortions is not more popular and is losing ground in the courts. He never­
theless shows that the fundamental privacy and equal protection arguments 
for abortion choice are better than some critics imagine. Tribe attempts to 
reduce concern relating to the welfare of the unborn. However, he does not 
alter the fact that, for many, the fetal personhood question is a genuine bar­
rier to wholehearted acceptance of constitutional privacy protection for 
abortion. It will remain so until acceptance of the feminist version of the 
history of reproductive laws overtakes concern for the fate of the unborn, or 
scholars like Tribe and Dworkin devise an appropriately persuasive argu­
ment for excluding, or limiting from consideration, the interests in and of the 
unborn. 
The abortion debate in the United States illustrates that merely recount­
ing feminist histories of women and reproductive law does not automatically 
convince pro-life proponents to abandon their demands for fetal protection 
and take up arms for women's privacy and equality. Vigorous, secure pro­
choice abortion policies will require our society to more thoroughly value 
women, their judgments, and their contributions outside the home. Such a 
fundamental change in values cannot be legislated by fiat. Ultimately, for 
women's interests to be protected, the force of law must be imposed on the 
unpersuaded, as it has been since Roe v. Wade. 
Although Tribe seems to appreciate the importance of j udicial willing-
95. Cf Janet Gallagher, Prenatal In vasions & Interventions: What 's Wrong with Fetai Righ ts, 
10  HARV. WoMEN's LJ. 9 ( 1987) (proposing a balancing test that recognizes governmental goals 
but prevents undue state intervention by valuing a woman's legal standing and bodily integriry). 
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ness to stand by anti-majoritarian and unpopular constitutional principles, 
he also clings to the possibility of broad public compromise. To set up his 
proposals for compromise, Tribe surveys abortion law and practices in other 
parts of the world and other periods of history. He describes the eugenic 
abortion policy of Nazi Germany to illustrate the evils of government over­
involvement in individual choices: Under the Third Reich, a "genetically 
pure" Aryan woman who had an abortion was subject to the death penalty, 
while "genetically defective" women were sterilized. 96 Contemporary India, 
on the other hand, symbolizes the extreme of government under-involve­
ment. In India, where there is a marked religious and economic preference 
for sons, the growing availability of amniocentesis has resulted in an increas­
ing number of abortions for gender selection. Predictably, the result has 
been a disturbing imbalance in the male-to-female population ratio. 97 
Abortion is also common in Japan, China, the Soviet Union, and Eastern 
Europe. In Japan, abortion has become the primary means of birth control 
due to an unusual level of fear about the safety of oral contraceptives and the 
scarcity of other means of contraception.98 Overpopulation in China has led 
to laws that allow only one child per family; additional pregnancies are sub­
ject to compulsory abortion.99 In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 
where abortion is legal and adequate contraceptives largely unavailable, as 
many as four out of five pregnancies are terminated. 100 
In most Western European countries abortion is legal, but only under 
certain circumstances, such as cases of rape or incest, or when the woman's 
health is endangered. Many of these countries also permit abortion where 
serious economic or social hardship for the woman would result. In France, 
a woman is entitled during the first ten weeks of pregnancy to judge for 
herself whether the hardship requirement is satisfied. 1 0 1  
Professor Mary Ann Glendon defends the Western European compro­
mise-which officially permits abortion only in hardship cases, but allows 
women to assess the acuteness of their own circumstances--on the ground 
that it "combine[ s] compassion with affirmation of life." 102 Noting the ab­
sence of widespread controversy over abortion in Western Europe today, 
Tribe nonetheless rejects the Western European "compromise ."  Contrasting 
his view with Glendon's, Tribe counters that this apparent solution, "within 
an Anglo-American legal system that has long insisted that law be composed 
of enforceable norms, seems to teach mostly hypocrisy . . . .  [It] is bound, in 
the long run, to offend American conceptions of equal justice. "  1 03 
Compromise, American style, must account not only for American legal 
96. P. 59. 
97. P .  65. 
98.  P. 60. 
99 P. 62. 
1 00. P.  56. 
1 0 1 .  Pp. 7 1 -73 .  
1 02.  M A R Y  A N N  GLENDON, ABORTION A N D  DIVORCE IN WESTERN L A W  20 ( 1 9 87). 
103.  Pp. 74 -75.  
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expectations and ideals, but also for the realities of American politics. Tribe 
maintains that Roe galvanized pro-life supporters to organize in virtually 
every state election. The right-to-life movement succeeded in electing candi­
dates sympathetic to its beliefs to Congress and state legislatures, but many 
elected officials were reluctant to act on such a controversial issue. 1 04 By 
1 984 it had become increasingly apparent that if Roe were to be overturned, 
the Supreme Court would have to do it. President Reagan appointed a third 
of the Court's members in his tenure. However, Tribe notes, the controversy 
that arose over Reagan's nomination of Judge Robert Bork-who openly 
expressed his belief that no constitutional right to privacy exists­
"powerfully displayed how deeply entrenched was the belief among the 
American people that there had to be such a right." 1 05 When the Supreme 
Court decided Webster in 1 989, the newly threatened pro-choice movement 
raised the privacy flag whose "current popular appeal clearly depends on 
keeping the question focused on who will make the decision . " 1 06 Webster 
awakened a pro-choice movement which had been lulled into a sense of se­
curity in the sixteen years since Roe. 
A number of states have already failed in their efforts to block access to 
abortion. For example, after Webster appeared to loosen lawmakers' reins, 
the Florida legislature nevertheless failed to pass antiabortion statutes. The 
Florida Supreme Court later declared a right to abortion under the state 
constitution, independent of Roe and the Federal Constitution. 107 Tribe re­
jects the argument, suggested by the experience in Florida, that overturning 
Roe and returning abortion to the states would have little or no impact on 
women's rights. He argues that if Roe was decided correctly and the Court 
properly recognized a constitutional right to abortion, this position is in­
defensible. Tribe argues that "making [women] fight for their reproductive 
liberty in the arena of politics, even if they do manage to win much of it 
back, is wrong-both morally and under our Constitution. " 108 Women 
should not have to expend time, money, and political resources vindicating a 
right that already belongs to them. Nor should they be forced to vote for 
pro-choice candidates who may not otherwise share their views, simply to 
gain recognition for rights they are legitimately afforded under the Constitu­
tion. Tribe's normative argument is sound, but the current composition of 
the Supreme Court makes it unlikely that the institution that he says ought 
to continue to recognize abortion privacy under the Constitution in fact will. 
The idea that abortion rights rest secure outside of the political arena cannot 
be sustained in the present context. 
For Tribe, any realistic version of abortion compromise in this country 
must guarantee federal constitutional protection for choice. In the conclud­
ing chapters of his book, Tribe analyzes proposed "compromises" that do 
104. Pp. 1 6 1 -65.  
105 .  P. 1 69 .  
1 06. P .  1 93. 
107.  In re T.W., 55 1 So. 2d 1 1 36 (Fla. 1 989). 
108. p 1 94. 
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less than this, criticizing virtually all of them as attempts by the pro-life 
lobby to make abortions more difficult to obtain. Tribe then proposes what 
he regards as meaningful compromises, based on better contraceptive pro­
grams, childcare assistance, and new technologies. Regarding the false com­
promises, Tribe argues that, "although the compromises are designed to 
sound reasonable, they would sacrifice much more than they would accom­
plish. "  1 09 Spousal consent requirements, for example, are relevant only 
where a woman wants to have an abortion against her husband's wishes. In 
such a situation, the wishes of only one party can prevail, and it is illogical to 
favor those of the husband over those of the wife, since she is the one who 
must bear the child. Parental consent requirements, too, operate on the as­
sumption that the woman--or girl-should not make such an important de­
cision on her own. Yet, Tribe points out, this reasoning implies that the 
parents would also be entitled to compel their immature daughter to have an 
abortion-a provision which, of course, is found nowhere in the law. Both 
spousal and parental consent requirements rob women of due autonomy. 
Parental notification requirements, while seemingly less oppressive than 
parental consent laws, share the unfortunate effect of compounding the 
stress and anxiety of a pregnant minor. The reproductive choices of minors 
are of grave concern to many families and communities and may therefore 
seem to warrant paternalistic public intervention. However, as Tribe points 
out, it makes no sense to impede freedom of choice by imposing parental 
notification requirements that guarantee no pregnant girl meaningful paren­
tal guidance, while placing some at risk of parental rejection or abuse. Thus, 
Tribe explains, the consent and notification laws, which sound like good­
faith attempts to foster family communication, in practice achieve little good 
and may cause much harm to already distressed women. 1 10 
Tribe takes particular exception to the abortion funding "compromise," 
which, with Supreme Court approval, restricts public support for poor wo­
men's abortions. Because the Court in Roe focused on the "negative" con­
cept of privacy, rather than the "positive" concept of equal protection, Tribe 
deems it "unsurprising that the Court later held that government has no 
constitutional duty to help women exercise [the right to obtain an abor­
tion] ." 1 1 1  It is not clear, however, that the privacy rationale of Roe is the 
true culprit. Surely the Court could read equal protection, no less than pri­
vacy, as merely a "negative" right of noninterference rather than a positive 
right t.o government assistance. Tribe nonetheless correctly argues that de­
nial of public funding for abortions in states where public assistance is avail­
able for childbirth but not for abortion creates a situation of inequality 
respecting indigent and affi.uent women and their families. This situation of 
distributive inequity, "is really no compromise at all and seems particularly 
immoral ." 1 12 Reproductive freedom is too important to be allowed to de-
1 09. P. 1 97.  
1 10. Pp. 202-03. 
I l l .  P. 206. 
1 1 2 .  P. 207. 
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pend on so random a characteristic as the extent of a woman's wealth. 
Professor Tribe thus argues that the commonly proposed compromises 
are not true compromises. Nominally, they purport to accommodate both 
pro-choice and pro-life viewpoints, but their real purpose is to reduce the 
number of abortions performed. These supposed compromises "promise 
abortion rights in principle but deny them in practice to those who are least 
able to bear the burden of motherhood-particularly the young, the unedu­
cated, the rural, and the nonwhite." 1 1 3 In order to achieve meaningful com­
promise, both absolutes must bend. The pro-life camp must recognize the 
rights of the woman, at least up to some point in pregnancy, as superseding 
those of the fetus, and the pro-choice camp must acknowledge that the be­
liefs of a significant sector of American society strongly disfavor unlimited 
abortion rights. The political "compromises" that Tribe regards as one­
sided result from the lack of precisely this sort of bilateral concession. 
In America, the most obvious starting point has been largely overlooked. 
Both sides would agree that reducing the number of unwanted pregnancies is 
desirable. Tribe proposes lowering the incidence of unwanted pregnancies in 
two ways. First, childbirth should be made more affordable--through better 
postnatal care programs, mandatory maternity and paternity leaves, subsi­
dized childcare, and flexible time arrangements in the workplace. Such 
measures would somewhat alleviate the problem of pregnancies unwanted 
for economic reasons. Second, sex education and safe, effective contmcep­
tion should be more widely available. 
This two pronged, common sense approach has not yet been adopted in 
the United States. Impeding its adoption, Tribe stresses, are societal beliefs 
regarding private responsibility and the role of women as childbearers. The 
conservative groups generally in favor of abortion restrictions see no reason 
to support expensive postnatal care and contraception programs because 
they favor the traditional system, wherein women bear and raise the 
children. 
Tribe discusses possible technological innovations that further illustrate 
his belief that outmoded stereotypes regarding women's roles are the founda­
tion of restrictive abortion policy preferences. For example, development of 
an artificial womb that could nurture a transplanted fetus at any point after 
fertilization would seemingly satisfy the concerns of both the pro-choice and 
pro-life camps. Women would not be forced to endure unwanted 
pregnancies and childbirth, and fetuses would still grow into babies. Tech­
nological innovation is, however, no panacea. States that chose to ban abor­
tion in reliance upon such technologies would have to bear the resulting 
costs, and nurturing the fetus, caring for the infant, and rearing the resulting 
children would be expensive. Even in the unlikely event that foster care 
could be found for every artificially nurtured fetus, the medical costs of such 
a program would be enormous. Thus, Tribe argues, one reason that such 
technological innovation has not occurred may be that "by comparison with 
1 1 3 .  P. 209. 
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any technological alternative, women represent cheap 'baby machines. ' ' ' 1 14 
More so, some regard women as the only morally appropriate "baby 
machines." 
A significant weakness in Tribe's analysis is his assumption that artificial 
womb technology would satisfy the concerns of all sides. Constitutional 
scholars have not adequately grappled with the possibility that some women 
who seek abortion are specifically, responsibly, and reasonably seeking to 
terminate the life of the potential child. 1 1 5 Indeed, women who fear that 
nobody will want their children may prefer abortion to non-fatal pregnancy 
termination. A woman who knows her genetically related or gestational 
child will be placed in an artificial womb, foster home, or adoptive family 
may feel compelled to reject a mode of pregnancy termination that nonethe­
less results in biological parenthood. Women who carry fetuses that, be­
cause of their illness, handicap, or race, are unlikely to be well cared for by 
others might elect to parent rather than turn their children over to the state 
or private charities to become society's refuse. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the sake of women's rights and the Constitution, Tribe searches for 
compromise. Tribe's extraordinary feminism is an appealing feature of his 
search: Mindful of history, he scrupulously avoids sacrificing women to 
mythical ideals of morality or majoritarian justice. Tribe believes that a pub­
lic commitment to safe, effective contraception and to childcare programs 
would serve the ends of compromise by reducing the need for abortion. 
And, although he agrees that the jurisprudence of Roe is imperfect, Tribe 
insists that the Supreme Court should preserve the constitutional protection 
Roe affords women. 
The Supreme Court will soon have another opportunity to overturn Roe 
v. Wade. The stage is set, for there are new faces on the bench and a series of 
precedents in place that criticize or ignore Roe. The Court is likely to seize 
its opportunity, and abortion policymaking will return substantially to the 
states. Some states, of which Florida and Connecticut are examples, have 
constitutional and statutory abortion protections already securely in place. 
But these protections are not permanently immune from politics, and in 
every state a bonfire of controversy potentially rages. Many states will enact 
and enforce statutes that leave women without equal protection or a mean­
ingful set of private reproductive choices. Congress has already considered a 
pro-choice Freedom of Choice Act. However, under the current administra­
tion, a national pro-choice abortion rights statute is unlikely to survive. 
The upshot of Tribe's book may not be the optimistic message he in­
tended. The Court is poised to abandon Roe. If Tribe is correct, the 
Supreme Court's  abandoning the right to choose would be a grand moral, 
1 1 4. p 225. 
1 1 5 .  See Ross, supra note 3 (arguing that the death of the fetl!S may be a reasonable and 
responsible preference). 
November 1 99 1 ]  TRIBE'S JUDICIOUS FEMINISM 203 
political, and constitutional error. At a minimum, the Court's abandoning 
Roe would make it that much harder for other institutions to mediate the 
clash of absolutes. It  appears that the political burden of championing lib­
eral abortion rights-which Tribe declares no woman should have to shoul­
der-will soon enough weigh heavily again on those who favor them. 
